Torah Talk Torah study for women

Is This Your Judaism? The Jew in Sefer HaKuzari

In the dialogue presented by Yehuda HaLevy in the third essay of his Sefer Hakuzari, between the King of the Khazars and the Chaver, the discussion focuses on what distinguishes the observant Jew. Which of the G-d given commandments mark him as specifically Jewish?

The Chaver opens the discussion by explaining that there are laws that we can understand and others that we accept because we know that they are Divine. He is, however, less interested here between the, generally accepted, division between mishpatim (social laws, including the Sabbath, where a rationale is often given) and chukkim (commandments usually beyond our understanding, such as the laws of the 'red heifer'). The distinction here is between 'civil and rational laws' and 'Divine laws that were additionally given to the nation of G-d'. The Chaver had already explained earlier (2, 48) that the concept of civil laws was universal. 'No community of people can function without these laws. Even a community of robbers cannot exist unless equity governs them'.

What, about the additional commandments 'given to the nation of G-d'? The first of these is brit mila, circumcision. 'Consider how little circumcision has to do with philosophy and how small is its social influence', says the Chaver. Abraham accepted it in his old age because it was a sign of the Covenant, 'the sign of the Divine Influence'. Circumcision has no moral or social rationale, the Chaver explains. This is not quite the way that others understood circumcision. Maimonides, who taught that all commandments have a rationale, writes 'As regards circumcision, I think that one of its objects is to limit sexual intercourse and to weaken the organ of generation...Circumcision simply counteracts excessive lust' However, he adds 'It gives to all members of the same faith, i.e., to all believers in the unity of G-d, a common bodily sign..' (Guide for the Perplexed, 3, ch.48). In this, Maimonides is in agreement with Yehuda HaLevy. The king of the Khazars elaborates, by pointing out the importance of the blessing that accompanies the brit mila, namely 'Blessed art Thou..Who hast commanded us to make our sons enter into the covenant of Abraham our father'. Circumcision was not unique to the Israelites; the Egyptians, amongst other nations, had circumcision. It is the motivation, the fact that it is the hallmark of the Abrahamic Covenant that makes the brit mila a vital characteristic of the Jew. The first statement of the Chaver in defining the Jewish religion at the beginning of the Sefer haKuzari was that, as a Jew, he believed in the G-d of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.

The Sabbath is the next defining commandment of the observant Jew – the Chaver speaks of him as 'our chassid' , the 'pious person' amongst us. Interestingly, Maimonides speaks of his model Jew as a tzaddik, a righteous, just person. The Sabbath is presented as one of the 'divine laws', even though the Torah gives reasons for its observance and the Chaver had said (3,7): Reason is out of place in matters of divine action, on account of its incapacity to grasp them. Reason must rather obey, just as a sick person must obey the physician..' As already said, HaLevy presents laws as divine because they were given specifically to the Israelites. In the case of the day of rest, it is once again the motivation , - 'remembrance of the Creation', 'remembrance of the Exodus', remembrance of the giving of the Law' are the ones mentioned – that sanctifies the day for Jews. Other nations have a day of rest, too, but even a king in a place where a day of rest exists, has to abandon it, if duty calls him. Not so the Jews. During the Sabbaths and Festivals, they are not at the beck and call of anyone other than G-d and that lends them independence and makes the Jew a free man, says the Chaver, for one sixth of his life, 'in rest of body and soul'. This is, of course, very important in a book that seeks to defend a 'despised faith'. As with circumcision, Maimonides is in partial agreement, stating that the Sabbath is 'a confirmation of our belief in Creation' (Guide, 3, ch.41).

To these two commandments, the Chassid adds the observance of a list of ritual laws, laws of purity, laws concerning plants, orlah that forbids fruit in the first years, kilayim that forbids planting mixtures, kashrut that limits the consumption of animals to specific species, laws concerning the Festivals, such as the blowing of the shofar and the four species used on the Festival of Tabernacles as well as the laws prescribing the various sacrifices. Since there were no sacrifices after the destruction of the Temple, it is assumed that learning about them is what is required of the Chassid.

All of these commandments constitute the distinctive religion of the Jew. They are divinely ordained and understanding them is a secondary consideration. Maimonides does not seem to agree that sacrifices distinguish the Jew: 'G-d allowed these kinds of service to continue. He transferred to His service that which has formerly served as a worship of created beings' (Guide, 3, ch.32), which seems to indicate that sacrifices were tolerated by G-d, rather than specifically prescribed. However, Maimonides continues 'By this Divine plan, it was effected that the traces of idolatry were blotted out and the truly great principle of our faith, the Existence and unity of G-d, was firmly established' (ibid.). It is a different perspective. Both thinkers recognise that ritual laws, including sacrifices, constituted the divinely ordained way of serving G-d and, as with circumcision, formed a bond between the members of the Jewish faith. It should be stressed again that, whereas other nations had sacrifices, many of the sacrifices of the Jew were intended to make him aware of his trespasses, aware of what was right and wrong.

The image of the Chassid that emerges is of someone wholly dedicated to the Covenant between G-d and the Jewish people. We do not see the Chassid as a universal figure. Because Yehuda HaLevy set out to distinguish his faith from other faiths, the emphasis here is on the individual. Even when the Chaver discusses the conviction of divine justice in the world, it is presented as conscious background for the seeming injustices that the Jew endures, 'he will then find no difficulty in picturing how we may recover our greatness..' (ibid).

The modern Jew , while agreeing with this image, tends to look beyond it. If we take one example from the twentieth Century, the Halakhic Man of Rav Soloveitchik, we will be struck by the difference in emphasis. The ideal of Halakhic Man is the halachah as a whole, with all of its Rabbinic input, that marks him as it did his Medieval ancestor, as a member of the Jewish faith.

'When halakhic man approaches reality, he comes with his Torah, given to him from Sinai, in hand. He orients himself to the world by means of fixed statutes and principles...When halakhic man comes across a spring bubbling quietly, he possesses a fixed, a priori relationship with this real phenomenon... the spring is fit for the immersion of a zav (a person suffering from impurity)...' (p.19, vi).

'Halakhic man implements the Torah without any compromises or concessions, for precisely such implementation, such actualisation is his ultimate desire. When a person actualises the ideal halakhah in the midst of the real world, he approaches the level of that godly man, the prophet...Halakhic man cannot be cowed by anyone...for is he not a creator of worlds, a partner of the Almighty in the act of creation?...He publicly protests against the oppression of the helpless, the defrauding of the poor, the plight of the orphan' (p.90, xv).

This modern Chasid/Tzaddik is conditioned by the same Torah as the Jew of Yehuda HaLevy or of Maimonides. His awareness of the real world and his interaction with it are determined by the Torah. It is this that distinguishes him as a Jew. He carries with him, as it were, the earlier character and takes him into his, present-day world.

Philosophical Truth and Torah Truth in the Kuzari

In the fifth Essay of the Kuzari, Yehuda HaLevy expands on views that he had stated briefly in the first Essay. The aim of the Jewish Chaver is to demonstrate to the King of the Khazars the merits of Torah truth in topics that philosophers had seemingly analysed successfully. Medieval Jewish thinkers were concerned to explore whether the 'god' of the philosophers, their description of the universe in terms of Spheres and basic constituent Elements, their analysis of the Soul were compatible with Jewish teachings. (A parallel exercise was undertaken for Islam by the Mutakalim).

The King of the Khazars asks for instruction on these matters and the Chaver agrees:

'I will give you a clear standpoint, which will assist you to acquire clear notions of matter and form, elements, nature, soul, intellect and metaphysics in general' (The Kuzari, Schocken Books, New York, 1964, p.249). There follow accounts of a First Cause, the Prime Creator and of the Active Intellect in the lowest of the Spheres, which is governed by the moon as well as a detailed chapter on the structure and functions of the Soul in accordance with the thinking of Greek philosophy as it was studied in the Arabic versions available at the time. The substance of the universe was presented, in accordance with the pre-Socratic teaching of Empedocles, as consisting of Four Elements, namely Air, Water, Earth and Fire.

These accounts are given in a neutral style, so that, most of the time, it is not clear whether the Chaver accepts them himself. However, in section fourteen of the fifth Essay, the Chaver clarifies his position. 'I feared', says the Chaver, 'that you would be deceived and acquiesce in their (the philosophers' ) views. Because they furnish mathematical and logical proofs, people accept everything they say concerning physics and metaphysics'. He then proceeds to question the validity of some of the Greek tenets, beginning with the Elements 'When did we ever accept an elementary fire? The highest degree of heat in the earth appears as coal, in the air as flame, in the water as boiling point' In other words, we can see 'qualities' of heat , cold, liquidity and solidity, but we nowhere see an Element. We cannot take the liquid from a plant and say it is water to drink, nor can we devise 'recipes', where given quantities of the Elements would constitute some object. Moreover, these ideas are not compatible with other ideas of the philosophers, such as the eternity of matter. If matter is eternal, there can be creation by means of he Elements.

Jewish teaching does not go along with these analyses of the philosophers. 'According to the Torah, it was G-d who created the world. There is no need to pre-suppose intermediaries or combinations [of Elements]. If we make Creation a postulate, all that is difficult becomes easy...Why should we need such artificial theories in order to prove the life of the soul after the dissolution of the body, considering that we have reliable information with regard to the return of the soul, be it spiritual or corporeal'. Trying to work out these matters using logic will get nowhere and take up all one's life.

Interestingly, the Chaver also makes use of logic to destroy the philosophers' arguments.'Why is not a philosopher conscious of himself when he is asleep or intoxicated? 'Does he then cease to be himself? If he loses his memory and later recovers, does he have two souls? If his character changes once he has recovered, does he have one soul in heaven and one in hell? Incidentally, these questions show Yehudah HaLevy to have been very modern in his arguing. Descartes' cogito ergo sum, I think, therefore I am, of the 17th Century was mocked by Voltaire in the 18th Century with the argument: what happens when I am not thinking? Yehudah HaLevy was writing in the 12th Century.

These speculations are not for Jews, since truths were revealed to them and reliably transmitted. Not only is it idle to speculate, G-d has withheld from most people answers, 'to obtain which no facilities have been granted to human nature. Only a few privileged individuals are allowed to grasp such things..' We, who are not prophets, have the benefit of their knowledge of truths. The philosophers do not have that benefit. They do not even agree with one another about their 'truths'; they only agree if they belong to the same school of thought, says the Chaver. Their own tool, reason, shows them to be fallible. However , philosophers are not wicked; they lead moral lives and they should be appreciated because they have raised important issues.

In this section of the Fifth Essay, the Chaver maintains the position that he took in the first Essay. However attractive the arguments of the philosophers may seem, they should not persuade us in these matters. They do not even persuade each other and we do not need them. The Torah, Revelation and the Prophets, followed by the Oral Law of the Sages, teaches truths that we can trust, because the transmission of those truths is reliable.